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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects




This article examines the relationship between criminal sen-
tencing and the characteristics of the individuals being sentenced
in Minnesota. Its purpose is to examine whether the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines have been successful in meeting their stated
objective of reducing the importance of certain offender character-
istics in sentencing. Part I of the article deals briefly with the
philosophical underpinnings of criminal justice systems and the
notion of punishment. Part II is an overview of determinate sen-
tencing systems in general and the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines in particular. Part III deals with the existing research in
determinate sentencing systems. Part IV is an empirical analysis
of determinate sentencing and its impact in Minnesota dealing
with two specific relationships between criminal sentencing and
felon characteristics. The first part of the analysis examines the
characteristics of felons who receive departures from the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines generally. The second part of the anal-
ysis examines the characteristics of felons who receive a specific
type of judge-made reason for departure from the sentencing
guidelines.
Part I: Philosophical Underpinnings:
Criminal law encompasses coercive governmental powers.
Governments maintain not only "civil order," but also their own
authority through enforced criminal codes. The choices of which
acts to call crimes and which punishments to apply to those crimes
are political ones. These decisions represent not only different
political but different philosophical rationales.'
* Blake J. Nelson received a B.A. from the University of Minnesota in 1989.
J.D. University of Minnesota (1993), Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota.
1. Philosophical rationales for punishment are manifold. For an overview of
two major philosophical traditions, "just deserts" and utilitarianism, see EDMUND L.
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Criminal law is a creation of the sovereign and has inherent
potential for discrimination against the politically disadvantaged.
In the United States, the criminal law has had a dichotomous char-
acter. While the criminal law has been codified by the legislatures
of the states and, to a lesser extent, the federal government, the
sentencing decisions under these criminal codes have been left to
judicial discretion. Potential friction is created between the legis-
lature that codifies the criminal law and the judiciary that imposes
sanctions. Policy problems, absent any moral judgments about the
merits of the criminal code and its enforcement, are, and have
been, serious concerns that manifest themselves in three ways.
First, and most simply, uneven application of the existing
criminal code is a problem which offends basic notions of equality
and fairness.2 Second, an incongruity concerning the philosophical
bases for punishment3 between the legislature and the judiciary, or
even within the judiciary, impart an incoherent or polychotomous
nature to the criminal justice system. Consequently no unified
theme or coherent pattern has been applied to criminal law.
While differing philosophical bases for punishment may not pro-
duce an overall uneven administration of the law in terms of pun-
ishment imposed, opposed philosophical bases for punishment will
produce no coherent philosophical basis for culpability. The result
is that no philosophically coherent purpose for punishment is ad-
vanced. Third, the potential exists that certain elements of the
criminal code will be undermined because they will not be en-
forced. Judges may fail to impose sanctions for certain crimes, in
effect, making those actions only technically illegal. The failure to
impose any meaningful sanctions for particular criminal code vio-
PINCOFFS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1991). A "just deserts" basis of punishment is pri-
marily concerned with treating people who are convicted of like crimes in the same
way. A utilitarian basis of punishment allows for concerns such as benefit to soci-
ety to be taken into account in sentencing. For a broad overview of different tradi-
tions of punishment, see David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment,
14 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115 (1991).
2. This basic notion of equality and fairness is meant as a general illustration.
For a general discussion, see PINCOFFS, supra note 1. These basic concepts have
different implications for different philosophical bases of punishment. For an illus-
tration of some interpretations of a fundamental concept of fairness, see Andrew
von Hirsh, Proportionality in Punishment Some Philosophical Issues, 16 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (forthcoming 1992).
3. By philosophical bases of punishment, I refer to many schools of thought on
why we should punish "criminals" such as "just deserts" or "utilitarianism." The
purpose of this article is not to explain these philosophical perspectives, but to
point out the existence of disparate views of punishment that would dictate differ-
ent treatment of "criminals." It is also to suggest that philosophical bases of pun-
ishment must also be taken into account when evaluating whether or not a
sentencing system is accomplishing the purposes it is established to accomplish.
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lations can undermine the purpose of the code without creating an
uneven administration of the law or creating conflicting philosoph-
ical bases for punishment.
Determinate sentencing systems represents a legislative at-
tempt to resolve conflicts inherent in the dichotomous nature of
the United States' criminal justice systems. Determinate sentenc-
ing systems are a political solution to a political problem. This ar-
ticle examines the Minnesota legislature's attempt to restrict the
authority of the Minnesota state judiciary and enforce a coherent
application of Minnesota's criminal law philosophically and politi-
cally. This article examines sentencing patterns before and after
the imposition of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to deter-
mine whether the legislative attempt to restrict the judiciary's de-
cision-making has reduced disparities in dispositional departures4
based on the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the con-
victed felons.
Part II: Overview of Determinate Sentencing:
Minnesota's determinate sentencing system went into effect
on May 1, 1980. The promulgation of the sentencing guidelines
represented the culmination of a drawn out political struggle5 that
paralleled similar sentencing decisions being made in other states.6
Throughout the United States, the realities of prison overcrowd-
ing, the failure of the "therapeutic model of punishment,"7 in-
creased demands for "get tough" policies on crime, and
4. Dispositional departures refer to departures from sentencing guidelines'
presumptive disposition: whether an individual should be imprisoned or not. The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines use two characteristics to determine the pre-
sumptive sentence. The first is the current severity of the offense. Felony offenses
are scaled from one to ten in severity, with one being the least severe and ten being
the most. The numerical value for the crime of which the offender has been con-
victed represents the offense severity score for that individual.
The second component used is a criminal history score. Each offense for which
the criminal has been convicted has a corresponding criminal history score value.
Offenders with no prior convictions have a criminal history score of zero. Thus, the
more convictions or the more serious the crime, the higher the criminal history
score. A mitigated dispositional departure represents a situation in which the Min-
nesota Sentencing Guidelines would have dictated that the judge impose a prison
sentence, but no prison sentence was imposed. Conversely, an aggravated disposi-
tional departure is a case in which the guidelines dictated that no prison sentence
be imposed, but a prison sentence was imposed.
5. The process by which the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were formu-
lated has been described by as a "three year struggle characterized by procedural
maneuvering, emotionalism and misunderstanding." James K. Appleby, Legislative
History, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 301, 301 (1982).
6. See generally Johnathon D. Casper & David Brereton, Evaluating Crimi-
nal Justice Reforms, 18 LAw & Soc'y REV. 121 (1984).
7. See, e.g., FRANcIs A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:
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documented socioeconomic, racial disparities in sentencings fueled
the push for sentencing reforms. Attempts at developing systems
to deal with these realities were many and varied. Generally, ap-
proaches towards sentencing practices have fallen into three broad
categories: prescriptive guidelines, which have the force of law,
"voluntary" guidelines, and indeterminate sentencing, which al-
lows for the greatest judicial discretion.
The move to determinate sentencing systems was spurred by
two opposed political forces. On one hand, "liberal" attacks on the
disparities of unfettered judicial discretion have been fueled by re-
search on biases against the socially disadvantaged, 9 disparities in
parole board decisions,1 0 and a wide range of racial and socioeco-
nomic disparities." On the other hand, the desire for "law and or-
der" and "get tough" policies on crime has been promoted by those
who have seen the unfettered judicial discretion as too lenient on
offenders.12 This twofold drive helps determine what type of de-
terminate sentencing system, if any, will develop in a given juris-
diction since the resultant sentencing system will largely be a
product of both drives. The critical issues that distinguish these
opposing political groups center around the nature of the determi-
nate sentencing systems, their scope and their underlying purpose
or philosophical bases.
Determinate sentencing systems premised on different philo-
sophical bases of punishment will treat individual offenders differ-
ently. A utilitarian model of punishment concerned with
recidivism13 will have little emphasis on the crime that the of-
fender commits. Instead this model will emphasize the likelihood
of the offender committing another crime.14 A utilitarian model of
punishment concerned with deterrence will demand longer
sentences for crimes where the deterrent effect associated with in-
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981) (discussing the empirical and political
failure of rehabilitative efforts).
8. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974);
DAVID FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF - THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS
(1975); ERNEST VAN DE HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD
AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975);
and ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE - THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
9. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
10. See generally Leonard Orland, Is Determinate Sentencing an Illusory Re-
form?, 62 JUDICATURE 381 (1979).
11. See supra note 8.
12. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
13. See PINCOFFS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
14. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984).
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carceration is the most effective.15 A "just deserts" model, on the
other hand, would emphasize the criminal act itself over other cri-
teria.16 As a result, an empirical evaluation of any determinate
sentencing system must be made in terms of its own expressed
philosophical basis. For example, criticizing a criminal law system,
which designates recidivism as a primary concern, for not propor-
tionately incarcerating those with a higher socioeconomic status is
inappropriate if members of that group are less likely to be recidi-
vists. On the other hand, this criticism could be applied to a just
deserts based criminal justice system because the political deci-
sions made in developing that determinate sentencing system
would not have been successful in carrying out their purpose.17
The attempt to resolve the potential conflicts between the
codification of the law and its administration have taken three dif-
ferent political avenues. First, there are judicially developed
guidelines. These guidelines offer the most autonomy to the judi-
ciary as arbiters of the law. This attempt at determinate sentenc-
ing represents an attempt to prevent uneven administration of the
law, and may have the effect of creating a coherent philosophical
basis for the criminal justice system. It still leaves open the poten-
tial of certain parts of the criminal code being undermined. This
method of creating sentencing guidelines is in the minority.'S
Second, the direct legislative approach has the legislature di-
rectly attempting to draft and enact a sentencing system that con-
strains the judiciary. This method of determinate sentencing
eliminates the potential frictions of uneven administration of the
criminal code, as well as providing a coherent philosophical basis
and not subverting the purpose of the criminal code. Most at-
tempts at determinate sentencing have been of this nature.19
However, this method represents a potentially more difficult prob-
lem of hammering out a determinate sentencing system between
the opposing political forces which may be present in the legisla-
15. See Pincoffs, supra note 1, at 15.
16. Id. at 15-19. See also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, The Politics of "Just Deserts", 32
CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the
Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW &
SOC'y 393 (1979); John Kramer & Robin L. Lubitz, Pennsylvania's Sentencing Re-
form: The Impact of Commission-Established Guidelines, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 481-
500 (1985).
18. Chris W. Eskridge, Sentencing Guidelines: To Be or Not to Be (1984) (un-
published paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crim-
inology, Cincinatti, Ohio).
19. See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Charging and Plea Bar-
gaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydrau-
lic Displacement of Discretion, 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155-76 (1987).
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ture. Because these forces seek sentencing systems for very differ-
ent reasons, the potential exists that neither side can put a
sentencing system into place. Thus, the potential exists that either
a philosophically incoherent and hence ineffectual sentencing sys-
tem is implemented, or that the parties cannot reach an acceptable
political compromise.
The "sentencing commission" approach on the other hand,
represents a method for not only addressing the major policy con-
cerns that seem to underlie some need for determinate sentencing
but also to ameliorate some of the problems associated with direct
legislative action. As a result, the "sentencing commission" has
gained perhaps the most attention in the literature as an innova-
tive and unique means of developing and implementing determi-
nate sentencing systems.20 The Minnesota Sentencing Commission
represents one of many possible types of sentencing commissions
and the one that has been most heralded and emulated as a
model.2 1
The Minnesota Guidelines:
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines represent a clear at-
tempt to eliminate the three major potential sources of friction be-
tween the codification of the criminal law and its administration.
First, they limit the problem of judicial subversion of the
criminal code by establishing prescribed 22 presumptive sentences23
for all convicted felons. A range in duration of sentences for each
combination of criminal history and current offense severity is set
by the guidelines. Additionally, the guidelines give some exem-
20. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
AND ITS GUIDELINES (1987).
21. Sentencing commissions differ in many particular respects. The member-
ship of the commission, the amount of legislative control, the nature of their au-
thority to draft guidelines without legislative action are some of the major ways in
which these sentencing commissions differ.
22. The sentencing guidelines in Minnesota are prescriptive, as opposed to de-
scriptive. Descriptive sentencing guidelines purport to examine current sentencing
practices and merely codify them. Prescriptive guidelines do not claim merely to
codify existing practice, but to determine and set ranges for crimes that are not nec-
essarily descriptive of previous practices.
23. Presumptive sentencing guidelines are "sentencing guidelines for individual
cases adopted by a sentencing agency, usually called a 'sentencing commission.' The
guideline sentence or range is presumptively applicable and the judge must give
reasons for imposing any other sentence; the adequacy of those reasons is generally
subject to appellate sentence review." MICHAEL H. ToNRY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS 102 (1987). Presumptive sentencing guide-
lines are contrasted with voluntary guidelines which are voluntary both in judicial




plary grounds for mitigated and aggravated departures.24 Under
normal circumstances a judge is limited to a narrow durational
sentence range to differentiate different convicted felons. Second,
the philosophical basis of the sentencing system is avowedly a
"modified" just deserts type.2 5 Third, the uneven administration
of the criminal law has been expressly addressed by forbidding
certain factors to be taken into account when the judge makes his
sentencing decision. Above all, the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines state that they are designed to embody the principle that
"sentencing should be neutral with respect to the race, gender, so-
cial or economic status of convicted felons." 26
Part III: Existing Literature:
The amount of sentencing discretion that remains with the
judiciary is central to the elimination of potential conflicts that ex-
ist between the codification of criminal law and its application. It
seems logical that presumptive sentencing guidelines are more
likely to have their intended effect than a system where compli-
ance is voluntary. Voluntary compliance by the judiciary or by
judges has been considered the predominant obstacle to effective
determinate sentencing systems.27
Most of the literature on determinate sentencing systems is
written under the theoretical assumption that disparities which
exist in the sentencing process will be tranferred to the adminis-
trative aspects of the legal system. In other words, most of the
literature asserts that the intention of the determinate sentencing
system would be circumvented by changes in charging and other
nonsentencing practices. 28 Research examining whether sentenc-
24. Grounds for both aggravated and mitigated departures are suggested by the
guidelines. Some have been added through legislation such as an aggravated depar-
ture for possessing "controlled substances" in a "school zone" or "park zone."
MINN. STAT. 244.095 (1991).
25. Since the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines use only criminal history score
and offense severity in determining presumptive sentences, a true "just deserts"
model would entail a strong emphasis on offense severity with minimal emphasis
on criminal history score. The "modified just deserts" model employed by the Min-
nesota Guidelines places a moderate emphasis on offense severity with a low em-
phasis on criminal history. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,
THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUA-
TION 10-14 (1984).
26. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE 26 (1981).
27. I RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1983) (hereinafter THE SEARCH FOR REFORM); TONRY, supra note 23.
28. The predominant literature in this area examines plea bargaining as a
means by which the discriminatory effects eliminated in sentencing decision are not
ameliorated, but merely moved to the administrative side of the criminal justice
19921
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ing disparities under such a system have been eliminated is sparse.
However, it is important to note that even presumptive sentencing
guidelines have a certain permissible universe of dispositional and
durational 29 departures which are available to the sentencing
judge.
The lack of empirical research testing determinate sentencing
systems against their stated purposes is also a noted weakness of
the existing literature.3 0 Most of the research in the area of judi-
cial compliance comes from states, via their sentencing commis-
sions or other responsible state departments.3 '
One of the reasons the current empirical research in determi-
nate sentencing is not definitive is the broad range of sentencing
guideline systems that exist and the absence of available data to
analyze. The existing empirical studies involve examinations of
the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law,3 2 the Penn-
sylvania guidelines, ss the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,34 and
most recently the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 35 Research into
the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law has been
system. See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Evaluation of Minne-
sota's Felony Sentencing Guidelines (1987); Heumann & Loftin, supra 17; and Al-
bert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
550 (1978).
29. A durational departure is a departure from the presumptive sentence dura-
tion imposed by the guidelines based on whatever criteria the guidelines use to de-
termine the presumptive sentence. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
predominantly use two factors to determine a presumptive sentence. See supra
note 4.
30. See generally THE SEARCH FOR REFORM, supra note 27; SANDRA SHANE-
DuBow ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT,
AND EFFECT (1985); and TONRY, supra note 23.
31. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF
1988 SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONVICTED FELONS (1990); MINNESOTA SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1990); and MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984). These tend to be periodic in nature
and focus on issues of particular concern to the legislature at the time, such as in-
termediate sentencing and other issues.
32. See Jacqueline Cohen & Michael Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and their Im-
pacts, in II RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 305, 353-411
(1983).
33. See John Kramer & Robin L. Lubitz, Pennsylvania's Sentencing Reform:
The Impact of Commission-Established Guidelines, 31 CRIME & DEUINQ. 481-500
(1985).
34. See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socio-Economic Dispari-
ties Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Pre- and Post-
Guideline Practices in Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985).
35. See, e.g., Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40
Emory L. J. 400 (1991).
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hampered by the lack of data regarding offender characteristics
and case attributes.38 Examination of Pennsylvania's voluntary
guidelines has found that sentencing disparities have been re-
duced, but sentencing remains highly variable.37 The research into
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines concentrates on the types of
prosecutions taking place under the pre- and post-guidelines peri-
ods and did not examine offender characteristics in sentencing.38
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have received only a
little more empirical attention. While they have been the subject
of considerable attention as the first prescriptive and presumptive
determinate sentencing system to be implemented, the literature
has been mainly concerned with descriptive research into the his-
tory of the development of the guidelines.39 The empirical re-
search done regarding the effectiveness of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines has been based on data from only the first
four years that the guidelines were in effect.40 Terance D. Miethe
and Charles A. Moore examined the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
line Commission's empirical research by the use of regression anal-
ysis41 of data from the first year of the guidelines.42 The analysis
confirmed that dispositional and durational departures were more
predictable and uniform under the sentencing guidelines than
under non-regulated sentencing decisions. However, sentencing
decisions not covered by the guidelines, such as the imposition of
jail time as a condition of a stayed prison sentence, were found to
be influenced by social and economic characteristics of the of-
fender.43 Miethe and Moore did not, however, examine the ways
in which judicial discretion over dispositional or durational depar-
tures may be influenced by the offender's economic and social
36. Cohen & Tonry, supra note 32.
37. Kramer & Lubitz, supra note 33.
38. Katie & Sager, supra note 35, at 428 et seq. (focusing on the case law
problems in taking into account offender characteristics).
39. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years Af-
ter: Reflections on Dale G. Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution
of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REv. 727-54 (1991); Kay Knapp,
What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has not Accomplished, 68 JUDICA-
TURE 181 (1984).
40. 1981, 1982 and 1984.
41. Regression analysis is a statistical estimation technique that attempts to ex-
plain variation in a dependent variable (e.g. whether an individual is sentenced to
prison) based on a set of independent variables. For a description of regression
analysis, see ROBERT S. PINDYK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS
AND ECONOMIC FOREcASTs (1991).
42. Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Radical Differences in Criminal
Processing: The Consequences of Model Selection on Conclusions about Differential





The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission itself con-
ducted an empirical study of the effects of its guidelines.45 In
three in-depth studies, the Commission primarily used descriptive
statistics to examine the effects of the guidelines on sentencing
practices. Descriptive statistics tend to paint a picture that maxi-
mizes the desired effects of the sentencing guidelines and mini-
mizes the apparent deviations in sentencing. For example, when
assessing durational departures, mitigated and aggravated, the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission routinely expressed
them as a percentage of all cases in the data, rather than all cases
which are eligible for a dispositional departure. In the case of ag-
gravated dispositional departures, the number should, instead, be a
percentage of defendants with a presumptive stayed sentence, and
in the case of mitigated dispositional departures, a percentage of
presumptive executed prison terms.46 This can create a very dif-
ferent picture of the amount of judicial departure that actually
takes place from the guidelines themselves. Such judicial discre-
tion may occur in a number of ways. One obvious example in-
volves dispositional departures. Suppose a situation where most of
the dispositional departures are of the mitigated type, while rela-
tively few are aggravated. Further suppose that the number of
people eligible for aggravated departures is equal or greater than
that eligible for mitigated departures. In such a case, the percent-
age of total dispositional departures may be low, while the percent-
age of mitigated dispositional departures is very high. In sum,
descriptive statistics can distort what is actually happening by
making inappropriate comparisons.
By stressing the role of prosecutorial power and discretion,
the literature in the area of determinate sentencing neglects the
role of judges and how judges react to the imposition of a determi-
nate sentencing system. The theoretical justification for this ap-
proach is that constraints on judicial decision-making provide the
44. Miethe and Moore's analysis looked at uniformity in sentencing decisions in
general, rather than looking at dispositional departures. Several other studies by
Miethe and Moore have concentrated on the charging and plea bargaining practices
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as a means of circumventing the intent
of the guidelines. See Charles A. Moore & Terance D. Miethe, Regulated and Non-
Regulated Sentencing Decisions: An Analysis of First-Year Practices Under Minne-
sota's Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 253-77 (1986).
45. The most significant of these is a 1984 analysis of the impact of the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines on sentencing in general. MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984).
46. Frase, supra note 39.
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opportunity for sentencing disparities to be displaced through
prosecutorial and other decisions outside the domain of the sen-
tencing guidelines.47 This displacement rationale seems to suggest
two conclusions which may or may not be borne out by more in-
depth empirical research. First, prosecutorial discretion is not be-
ing exercised to discriminate, at least not to the same extent, as it
was before the imposition of the determinate sentencing system.48
Second, there is an overall institutional bias that will compensate
for the elimination of the judicial decision bias.49
While there may be institutional biases other than judicial
discretion, it does not seem as likely that prosecutors, for example,
will either consciously or intuitively "take up the slack" or some of
the "slack" in discriminatory effect left by the elimination of judi-
cial discretion. Indeed, if it is the purpose of determinate sentenc-
ing to remedy the abuses of indeterminate sentencing systems, it is
even more logical that these abuses are the results of judicial deci-
sion-making in sentencing. It is an heroic assumption to assume
that the imposition of a determinate sentencing system would nec-
essarily change the underlying philosophical, practical, or psycho-
logical motives of the sitting judiciary. It cannot be assumed that
simply because variance, in terms of sentencing practices, has less-
ened that the same amount of disparate treatment is not taking
place. It may be that the same disparate treatment has been dis-
placed and constrained, but not eliminated. The question then be-
comes whether the constraint existing in the determinate
sentencing system is sufficient to keep judicial abuses in check or
if the natural room for "maneuver" within the sentencing system
allows these abuses to resurface in a displaced and/or ameliorated
form.
47. Alschuler, supra note 28; Todd R. Clear et al., Discretion and the Determi-
nate Sentence: Its Distribution, Control and Effect on Time Served, 24 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 428 (1978); and Candace McCoy, Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining
Bans, and Hydraulic Displacement in California, 9 JUsT. Sys. J. 256 (1984). These
include not only non-judicial decisions, but sentencing not covered by the guide-
lines, such as non-felony sentencing.
48. Certainly, if plea bargaining and other forms of prosecutorial discretion
were discriminating to the same extent before the determinate sentencing system
was put into effect, there would be no purpose in studying it as a causally related
phenomenon.
49. To put this another way, this suggests that there is a sum total of discrimi-
natory effect in the system. Out of this sum total a certain amount is expressed in
sentencing decisions. When the ability to express this discriminatory effect in sen-
tencing decisions is removed from one part of the system, the system as a whole
will express this discriminatory effect elsewhere in the system to compensate.
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Part IV: Objectives of this Article:
The empirical analysis in this article will evaluate the sen-
tencing practices in Minnesota since the introduction of the Min-
nesota Sentencing Guidelines as they relate to uniformity,
neutrality and proportionality in sentencing, and how they relate
to the underlying philosophical basis of the guidelines. The data
used in the analysis is from one pre-guideline period (1978), the
yearly felony conviction data since the Guidelines (1981 through
1989) as well as four in-depth post-guideline studies (1981, 1982,
1984, 1987). The specific objectives of this research are twofold:
1) To determine the extent to which proportionality and uni-
formity have been improved in dispositional decisions
(whether or not the offender should go to jail) in terms of ra-
cial and socioeconomic factors.
2) To determine if judge-made decisional law50 has resulted in
a reintroduction of criteria into the sentencing system that the
guidelines specifically intended to eliminate.5 1
Methodology:
The first question was examined using the four in-depth stud-
ies and the 1978 study. Most of the data already collected was of a
summary nature, on dispositional departure rates of the system as
a whole,52 which can lead to an imprecise picture of whether there
is any systematic bias in decisions of whether or not to grant dispo-
sitional departures.5 3 As previously noted, commentators have
found that indeterminate sentencing systems led to discriminatory
application of sentences based on racial and socioeconomic fac-
tors,5 4 and it is these same criteria that the Minnesota Sentencing
50. The guidelines represent a framework within which judicial modification
can and clearly has occurred. Judge-made law can create any number of modifica-
tions to these guidelines such as allowable reasons for departure (mitigated or ag-
gravated), the appropriate way to compute criminal history scores and the effects of
multiple offenses being prosecuted simultaneously.
51. Such criteria includes racial, educational, and socioeconomic factors.
52. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 39, at 739. Frase points out that the extent of
deviation from the guidelines themselves appears different if you look at mitigated
and aggravated dispositional departures as a percentage of cases eligible for those
departures as opposed to a percentage of the total number of cases. Obviously,
looking at mitigated and aggravated departures as a percentage of the total number
of cases will give you a lower percentage than if you were to compute them as per-
centages of those cases eligible for such a departure.
53. Simply because there are more African-Americans getting mitigated or ag-
gravated departures as a percentage of eligibles than whites does not necessarily
mean that racial bias is taking place in the sentencing system. For example, it is
possible that African-Americans and whites as groups commit different kinds of
crimes, different numbers of crimes, occupy different socioeconomic statuses, have
different educational backgrounds, etc.
54. See supra, notes 7, 8, 9 and 10.
[Vol. 10:217
1992] MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Guidelines have sought to eliminate.55 Additionally, commenta-
tors have hypothesized that the introduction of judicially based
reasons for departure reintroduce not only socioeconomic and ra-
cial factors back into the sentencing decision, but many social and
lifestyle factors.5 6
Questions addressed by this study are:
1. Has the sentencing system eliminated some of the "typi-
cal" racial and socioeconomic biases of indeterminate sentencing?
2. If so, to what extent has the sentencing system eliminated
them?
3. Has amenability to treatment reintroduced these biases,
and does it introduce other social biases as suggested by Miethe
and Moore?
The factors, suggested by the literature as having an influ-
ence on sentencing decisions, were incorporated into a multivariate
model of judicial sentencing. The analysis examines the condi-
tional probability that an individual having a particular character-
istic will be granted a dispositional departure due to each
impermissible reason for departure.5 7 In doing this, it also allows
55. See supra note 26.
56. See MIETHE & MOORE, supra note 28. Miethe and Moore assert that "ame-
nability to probation is strongly associated with various offender characteristics
(e.g., community ties, family stability, employment status)," and that "this justifica-
tion for departures seems likely to adversely impact both proportionality and neu-
trality of punishment." Id. at 24. Amenability to treatment is one judicially based
reason for dispositional departures (not durational) that has received much atten-
tion as potentially subverting the purpose of the sentencing guidelines system.
57. There are still methodological problems involved in this. The most prob-
lematic aspect may be in not including control variables for criminal history and
offense severity. These factors were not included because there is a problem with
the inappropriate weighting of factors since certain criminal history and offense se-
verity scores are eligible only for mitigated departures and others are eligible only
for aggravated departure. Hence, by the nature of the guidelines, there would be
too much explained by these factors if they were included. I am sacrificing a good-
ness of fit and predictive ability of the model to ascertain at least the direction of
these impermissible factors. The main purpose is to see if there is a consistent rela-
tionship over time. When I examine amenability to treatment as a subset of miti-
gated departures these problems are somewhat ameliorated since everyone in both
groups is within the eligible criminal severities and criminal history scores. I gen-
erated a correlation matrix for a number of possible variables relating to socioeco-
nomic status, education, race, criminal history and offense severity. A correlation
matrix produces a set of correlation coefficients that show the simple association
between each pair of variables. A correlation coefficient is a number which is a
measure of association that ranges from -1 to + 1, with 0 indicating no relationship
or association between the variables. Positive one indicates perfect positive associa-
tion, negative one indicates perfect negative association. By correlating different
racial groups with different types of crimes, we can see if they are highly associated
- if one racial group is more likely to be associated with a particular crime. I found
no statistically significant correlations between race, occupation, criminal history or
offense severity. In fact, as a whole, I generally found no significant correlations
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us to see if there are any particular patterns of certain offender
characteristics that systematically have an impact on the decision
to grant a dispositional departure from the Guidelines' presump-
tive sentence.58 By finding out which of the variables in the equa-
tion carry the greatest weight it is possible to examine whether
judges are using impermissible criteria in their sentencing deci-
sions. This was done by using a probit model5 9 which determined,
out of all convicted felons, what factors had the most influence in
whether an aggravated or mitigated dispositional departure was
granted.
The second research objective was accomplished through a
probit analysis of the data contained in the four in-depth panel
studies (1981, 1982, 1984, 1987).60 Several different regression mod-
els were used to test to what extent prohibited criteria were mak-
ing their way back into the sentencing decisions covered by the
guidelines. In examining whether an "amenability to treatment"
mitigated dispositional departure was given, a series of variables
other than the expected negative correlation coefficients for dummy variables (vari-
ables representing a single category, such as whether an individual is caucasian,
usually coded with a 0 or 1) from the same categorical variable (hence "White" cor-
related highly negative with "Black," "Asian," etc. since an offender can only be
one race this statistically significant correlation is to be expected). Thus, in at least
the samples I used, people of different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds did
not seem to commit different types of crimes or have different criminal histories
(at least to the extent of being statistically significant).
58. For example, are whites committing property crimes more likely to get a
mitigated departure than non-whites with the same criminal history committing
the same property crimes. Or if there is no such disparity for crimes against per-
sons controlling for criminal history and offense severity.
59. For an explanation of probit models, see PINDYK & RuBINFELD, supra note
41, at 254-57.
60. A probit analysis was used because of the problems using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression equations when the dependent variable is dichotomous.
O S regression is a technique which minimizes the sum of squared errors (simply,
the sum of squared errors is the difference between the predicted values the equa-
tion generates and the actual data squared and added together). OLS regression
uses this sum of squared errors to plot a unique line through the data. This line is
found by finding the line that has the least sum of squared error. In OLS regres-
sion, the correlation coefficient estimated is the slope of the O. regression line.
In the case of regression where you have more than one variable explaining the de-
pendent variable, the partial regression coefficients represent the change in the de-
pendent variable associated with a unit change in the independent variable,
controlling for all other independent variables. It represents the independent ef-
fect of the one independent variable on the dependent variable. In the case of a
dichotomous dependent variable, this slope coefficient is meaningless. There is not
a range of values that the dichotomous dependent variable can have; there are only
two possible values. Probit models use a different model form. Instead of being
linear, the probit model uses an s-shaped curve, to more closely approximate the
fact that there are only two possible outcomes for the dependent variable. See gen-
erally JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT AND
PROBIT MODELS (1984).
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that are not supposed to be taken into account (e.g. race, gender,
marital status, employment status, educational attainment) were
examined.61 These variables became the independent (or predic-
tor) variables to attempt to determine whether an "amenability to
treatment" mitigated dispositional departure was given to felons
with certain characteristics as opposed to other convicted felons re-
ceiving mitigated departures.
Because of the prescriptive and presumptive nature of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, these regulated sentencing deci-
sions should show a high level of determinacy based on the appli-
cable prescriptive criteria.6 2 Offender characteristics, on the other
hand, should have no appreciable impact on sentencing decisions
after the guidelines go into effect. This has several implications.
When we specify a model of judicial decision-making that contains
predominantly impermissible bases for granting a dispositional de-
parture from the presumptive sentence, the variables should not
be statistically significant and should not show continuity over
time. If there is statistical significance over time for these vari-
ables, and there is also a continuity in both direction and magni-
tude of some of these variables, it will be clear that they do
influence judicial decisions to depart from the Minnesota Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. If judicial discretion is operating in a systemati-
cally biased manner, the literature suggests that this bias would be
more pronounced in the case of "amenability to treatment" miti-
gated dispositional departures because of the opportunity they pro-
vide to reintroduce impermissible offender characteristics. 63
The Data
The research questions were analyzed using two primary
sources of data. In the first, state-wide monitoring data on all post-
guideline time periods up until 198964 and a sample of pre-guide-
line cases collected in 1978 as a baseline measure of offender char-
acteristics, sentencing decisions, and case attributes were used. In
the second, four in-depth panels for the post-guideline years 1981,
1982, 1984 and 1987 were used. The yearly evaluation data on all
felony convictions in the district courts in Minnesota contain less
case attribute and offender characteristic data than the in-depth
61. See supra note 16.
62. Predominantly offense severity and criminal history score.
63. See Miethe & Moore, supra note 28.
64. The last year for which the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
had data prior to publication.
1992)
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panels,65 but it provides information on criminal history, offense
severity, dispositional and durational departures, and some of-
fender characteristics.66 Even though there is not as much socio-
economic data, racial dispositional disparities can be examined
controlling for criminal history, offense severity and some offense
and offender characteristics.
The in-depth samples6 7 of pre-guideline data (19786w) and
post-guideline data (1981,69 1982,70 1984,71 198772) contain a great
65. Factors such as occupation, employment at time of sentencing, and school
education are left out of the data.
66. Such as race, age, sex.
67. The data for each of the subsequent time periods were collected from the
following sources: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines worksheets (except 1978 data),
Minnesota Department of Correction files, Minnesota State Judicial Information
System (SJIS) transaction reports (which provided the case number for coder
tracking through the court system), court transcripts, initial complaints filed by
prosecutors, arrest reports and pre-sentence investigation reports. These samples
were stratified which means that a random sample is drawn from each of several
different groups which compose the entire population. Stratifying by race means
that an independent random sample was drawn from all white felons, another in-
dependent random sample was drawn from all African-American felons, and so
forth until all the groups that compose the entire population of felons are sampled.
68. This data covers a year long-period two years before the guidelines went
into effect. It was collected by taking an approximate sample of 50 percent of fel-
ony offenders sentenced in district court between July 1, 1977 and June 30, 1978.
The sample included the entire population of female offenders and about 42 per-
cent of all male offenders from each of Minnesota's 87 counties. Data on alleged
offense behavior, victimization, conviction offense, criminal history, offender char-
acteristics, case processing, and plea negotiations were contained in this base line
data set.
69. This data covers the first 18 months under the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines, May 1, 1980 to October 1, 1981. The sample of cases included in this study
were stratified by disposition, county, race and sex. Also included in this sample is
the population of cases that were committed to the Commissioner of Corrections
and samples of stayed sentences from eight Minnesota counties (Anoka, Crow
Wing, Dakota, Hennepin, Olmstead, Ramsey, St. Louis, and Washington). The sam-
ple of stayed sentences was stratified by gender and race with female and minority
offenders sampled at a higher rate than white males to increase the representative-
ness of the smaller subpopulations. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMIS-
SION, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR
EVALUATION 20 (1984).
70. These data cover an additional 12 month period from October 1, 1981 to Sep-
tember 31, 1982. This data set contains the population of offenders committed to
the Commissioner of Corrections from eight Minnesota counties (Anoka, Crow
Wing, Dakota, Hennepin, Olmstead, Ramsey, St. Louis, and Washington). Id. at 19-
20.
71. These data cover a subsequent 12 month period from November, 1983 until
October, 1984. The sample is similar in scope and design to that used in the 1981
and 1982 studies. There are some differences in the coding of variables that needed
to be taken into account. Most notably: the categories listed under occupation
changed from the 1978, 1981, and 1982 to the 1987 study. The categories "disabled"
and "youth", present in the 1978, 1981 & 1982 samples were discarded. "Owner"
and "agricultural worker" were added for the 1984 and 1987 studies. Id.
72. The primary purpose of this in-depth study was to provide information on
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deal of data regarding the offenders' socioeconomic status, educa-
tional background, and other measures of "community ties" such
as residence, marital status and so on. While much of the in-depth
data on 1981, 1982 and 1983 was drawn from eight of Minnesota's
most populous counties, the samples still provide an opportunity to
examine the role of offender characteristics in the judge's sentenc-
ing decision. Acquittals, dismissals and convictions for gross or
petty misdemeanors are not included in the in-depth data. How-
ever, the primary concern is whether discrimination is still taking
place within the sentencing decision process, not whether it exists
outside the process.
The 1987 in-depth data provides, perhaps, the best estimation
of the actual effects of offender characteristics on mitigated dispo-
sitional departures. This data contains the population of all con-
victed felons receiving a mitigated dispositional departure with the
rest of the sample stratified73 by race and gender. It also provides
the best estimation of mitigated dispositional departures and de-
partures due to "amenability to treatment," a substantial subset of
mitigated dispositional departures.
Mitigated and Aggravated Dispositional Departures
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are designed to em-
body the principle that "sentencing should be neutral with respect
to the race, gender, social or economic status of convicted
felons."74 Consequently, the decision on the length and manner of
sentencing convicted felons should be made regardless of these
considerations. Yet, empirical research has not fully examined
whether this is the case.
Previous research does, however, suggest variance in terms of
sentencing decisions has been reduced since the imposition of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 75 However, the questions of
what factors go into the judicial sentencing decisions under the
intermediate sanctions. This in-depth data collection effort collected a sample of
cases from 37 Minnesota counties to provide a baseline set of data to guide policy
and decision-making in the use of intermediate sanctions. The cases sampled were
from the population of convicted felons sentenced to a stayed sentence between No-
vember 1, 1986 and October 31, 1987. The sample consisted of a sample of those
who received a presumptive stayed sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines and the population of cases where mitigated dispositional departures
were granted and was otherwise stratified by race and gender. MINNESOTA SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS (1991).
73. See supra note 63.
74. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE 26 (1981).
75. See Miethe & Moore, supra note 34; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
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guidelines and whether the guidelines have materially altered the
supposed biases and problems which they were meant to address
have been largely unexplored. Since one of the basic premises of
determinate sentencing is that judicial discretion has resulted in
abuses in sentencing, attempts to constrain judicial discretion
should be met with resistance if actual biases do exist. If such bias
exists, it will likely express itself within the boundaries of the sen-
tencing guidelines as it did before their inception. The biases could
be expressed through permissible departures allowed by the sen-
tence guidelines themselves. Such departures should show these
alleged biases discriminatory effect. The primary difference is that
these biases would be expressed under acceptable reasons for de-
parture from the guidelines, even though the same impermissible
factors were still being factored into the judicial sentencing
decision.
To test whether the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are op-
erating as intended (i.e. the exclusion of race, sex, socioeconomic
status and community ties as variables in the decision-making pro-
cess), a model of judicial decision-making that takes these prohib-
ited factors into account was specified. In the second part of this
analysis, the same set of predictor variables, prohibited criteria,
was used to determine whether or not an individual offender is
more likely to get a mitigated departure due to amenability to
treatment.
Dependent Variable
Two models were specified, each with a different dependent
variable. In the first model, the dependent variable was whether a
mitigated dispositional departure was granted. A mitigated dispo-
sitional departure was coded 1, whereas both aggravated disposi-
tional departures and no dispositional departure were coded 0. In
the second model, the dependent variable was whether an aggra-
vated dispositional departure was granted. An aggravated disposi-
tional departure was coded 1, whereas both mitigated dispositional
departure and no dispositional departure were coded 0.
Race: Race was coded as a series of dummy variables.76
COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE
YEAR EVALUATION (1984).
76. A dummy variable is a way to take categorical data, such as race and create
data that can be used as if it were a number that is meaningful for statistical esti-
mation. Simply, a dummy variable is a variable which is coded as one of two values
(usually zero or one). Thus each racial category (White, Black, Hispanic, etc.) has
its own dummy variable. Each racial category was assigned its own variable where
1 represents someone of that racial background; otherwise it was coded zero.
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White (White), African-American (Black), Hispanic (Hispanic),
American Indian (Indian), Asian (Asian) and Other were used,
with Other being dropped out of the equation to prevent
collinearity.77
Socioeconomic Status: Socioeconomic status was coded as a
series of dummy variables each representing a certain occupation:
Unemployed (unemploy), Owner (owner), Professional (profess),
White Collar (whitec), Skilled Labor (skill), Unskilled Labor (un-
skill), Agricultural laborer (ag), and Other, with Other being
dropped to avoid collinearity.
Marital Status: Single (single) was coded as the variable to
indicate any other status other than married.
Gender: Male (male) was coded 1; female 0.
Residence: Residence was coded as a series of dummy vari-
ables: Alone (alone), with Spouse (spouse), with other Family
(family), with Friends (friends), in an Institution (inst), or with
Employer. Living with Employer was dropped to avoid
collinearity.
Since either a mitigated or an aggravated departure as a de-
pendent variable is dichotomous, 78 Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS)79 regression is inappropriate to use in this case.8 0 Instead, a
probit model which estimates parameters for each of the variables
above by a maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE) technique8 ' was
used.
Mitigated Dispositional Departures
The first model was designed to examine the effects of the
77. Any regression model assumes that no exact linear relationship exists be-
tween any of the independent variables in the model. If such a relationship exists,
they are collinear. If perfect collinearity exists coefficients cannot be calculated,
because there is no unique solution to the equation. In the case of dummy vari-
ables, since all racial categories are mutually exclusive and every felon must fall
into one of those categories, if we included every dummy variable for racial classifi-
cation in the equation, they would be perfectly predictive of each other. In order to
be able to solve the equation, one of the categories of race (or sex, or socioeconomic
status, etc.) must be left out. See generally PrNDYx & RUBINFELD, supra note 41 at
83-84.
78. Dichotomous simply means that it has two possible outcomes.
79. See supra note 60.
80. See ALDRICH & NELSON, supra note 60.
81. A maximum-likelihood estimate technique is designed to pick parameter es-
timates that imply the highest probability or likelihood of having obtained a partic-
ular observed sample. In simple cases, these will be identical to the estimates
generated by the least-squares estimators. It is in situations where violations of
OLS are violated, such as the dependent variable being dichotomous, that the least-
squares estimates become biased, the maximum-likelihood estimates, however, re-
main unbiased. Id. at 49-52.
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above variables on the probability that a mitigated dispositional de-
parture was granted. The direction of the coefficients indicate
whether a mitigated dispositional departure was more or less
likely to be granted. A negative coefficient indicates it is less
likely that a felon in that category will receive a mitigated disposi-
tional departure. A positive coefficient indicates that it is more
likely that a felon in that category will receive a mitigated disposi-
tional departure.
Table 1 below indicates the results for running the probit
model on the data for 1978, 1981, 1984 and 1987:
TABLE 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Factors Influencing Mitigated
Dispositional Departures
Variable Coefficients by Year
mit 1978 1981 1982 1984 1987
RACE
white 5.84* 4.40* - .16 - .03 .42
black 5.13* 4.50* -. 05 -. 13 .75
indian 5.44* 4.42* .11 .11 .36
hispanic 5.69* 4.52* -. 15 -. 38 .32
asian 5.33* .36 .14 -. 22
JOB TYPE
unemploy -. 40 - .14 .185 .15 -.5***
youth -. 27*** dropped8 2  dropped N/A N/A
owner N/A N/A N/A -. 08 .67***
profes -.46 .78*** -. 18 .77*** .46**
whitec -. 21 .38*** .14 .54*** .15
skill .16 -. 19 .35*** .23 -. 3
unskill -. 03 -. 18 .17 .31 -. 87
ag N/A N/A N/A ****
MARITAL
single .05 -. 10 -. 40** -. 32** -. 25**
GENDER
male .41* .19 .50** .46** .72*
RESIDENCE
alone .06 -. 01 -. 08 .20 -. 14
spouse .30*** -. 10 .04 .10 -.43*
fam .05 -. 05 .45 -. 05 -.34**
friend - .15 **** .04 -. 40
inst -. 17 -. 30 -. 27 -. 38 -.51**
constant -6.78 -6.11 -1.95 -1.8 -1.62
* - significant at .001
** - significant at .01
- significant at .1
- due to perfect prediction of mitigated or not mitigated.
82. Due to collinearity, this category was dropped from this equation.
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The Effects of Race on Mitigated Departures:
In both 1978 and 1981, race was clearly the single most impor-
tant variable in explaining whether a mitigated dispositional de-
parture was granted. The coefficients for the racial variables are
substantially larger than the coefficients for the other variables
and they are statistically significant at the .001 level, i.e. the
probability is less than .001 that those race estimates are due to
chance. In the subsequent years, 1982, 1984 and 1987 race, as a de-
terminant of mitigated dispositional departures, is no longer statis-
tically significant nor are the coefficients nearly as large.
The Effects of Socioeconomic Status on Mitigated
Departures:
The most striking development between the pre-guidelines
and post-guidelines period is the role of socioeconomic status in de-
termining whether an offender receives a mitigated dispositional
departure. In the 1978 data, there are no statistically significant
relationships between occupation and mitigated departures. By
1981, however, a pattern develops with a consistent relation be-
tween mitigated dispositional departures and socioeconomic status.
The years of 1981, 1984, and 1987 all show statistically significant
and relatively large coefficients for "upper" socioeconomic groups
such as white collar workers, professionals and business owners.
These groups are far more likely to receive mitigated dispositional
departures after the guidelines were put in place than they were
before.
The statistical significance of a professional, or white collar
worker being more likely to receive a mitigated dispositional de-
parture seems to be very stable over time. By 1984 and 1987, this
relationship between socioeconomic status and likelihood of receiv-
ing a mitigated departure had become the most pronounced of the
statistically significant determinants of mitigated departures. This
suggests that the discriminatory effects sought to be avoided in
sentencing decisions are greater than before the guidelines were
established, at least in terms of the granting of mitigated disposi-
tional departures to upper socioeconomic groups.
The Effect of Marital Status on Mitigated Departures:
An offender's marital status in 1978 and 1981 bore little rela-
tion to the likelihood of receiving a mitigated departure. By 1982,
however, a clear and statistically significant pattern developed
where being single made it less likely that an offender would re-
ceive a mitigated dispositional departure. This supports authors
1992]
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who suggest that community ties play a role in judicial sentencing
decisions; a married felon can be viewed as more stable with
greater ties to the community than a single individual.
Fffects of Gender on Mitigated Dispositional Departure:
Gender is clearly another statistically significant factor in de-
termining whether a mitigated dispositional departure will be
granted. The likelihood that a felon will receive a mitigated depar-
ture is increased if that felon is a male in each of the years for
which the probit model was run, except for 1981.83 In 1978, 1982,
1984 and 1987 this likelihood shows clear and strong statistical sig-
nificance. The sentencing guidelines seemed to have little effect
on the role gender plays in determining whether to grant disposi-
tional departures.
Effects of Residence on Mitigated Departures:
Residence, like marital status, is another potential measure of
community ties. A less clear but statistically significant relation-
ship shows up in terms of the residence of the offender in the 1987
data. The data also suggests, in all four years, that an offender
who is institutionalized will be less likely to receive a mitigated de-
parture than a person who resides in any other type of residential
setting. This relationship becomes statistically significant in the
1987 data. This negative relationship becomes more pronounced
over the entire period being examined, suggesting that community
ties, or the lack thereof become more important in the judge's de-
cision not to grant a mitigated dispositional departure.
Aggravated Dispositional Departures
Looking at the same time period for aggravated departures,
there is a parallel trend that provides additional support for some
of the trends displayed in mitigated departures. Table 2 below
shows the coefficients for each of the years:
83. This is not necessarily unexpected. Due to the fact that 80 percent of all
convicted felons are male (MINNESOTA SENTENCING GuIDEUINES COMMISSION, 1991,
at 11), being a male will probably make it more likely that you will receive either a
mitigated or an aggravated dispositional departures if such departures are granted
proportionally to both genders since there are simply a larger absolute number of
males being sentenced.
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TABLE 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Factors Influencing Aggravated
Dispositional Departures
Variable Coefficient by Year
ag 1978 1981 1982 1984 198784
RACE
white .18 5.40* .17 4.97*
black .19 5.31* -. 06 4.88*
indian .04 5.26* .23 4.93*
hispanic -. 10 4.99* -. 24 5.00*
asian ****
JOB TYPE
unemploy - .16 .17 - .54 .19
owner N/A N/A N/A .32
profes - .27 -. 55*** -.33** *****
whitec -. 36*** -. 039 -. 51* .19
skill -. 28*** -. 11 -. 16 .05
unskill -. 26*** .01 -. 21 -. 01
ag N/A
MARITAL
single -. 09*** .11 .05 .20***
GENDER
male .42 .41 - .02 .23
RESIDENCE
alone -. 04 -. 03 .22 -. 13
spouse -. 23*** -. 28 .13 -. 06
fam -. 18 -. 07 .02 -. 06
friend -. 11 .23 .05 -. 1
inst .85* .34*** .59*** .58**
constant -1.42 -6.96 -1.378 -1.76
* - significant at .001
** - significant at .01
- significant at .1
- dropped due to perfect prediction of mitigated or not mitigated.
- no professional received an aggravated dispositional departure.
The patterns shown in the probit analysis of mitigated
departures are echoed strongly in the probit analysis of aggravated
departures for the same years. Most striking is the central role
that race seems to play.
Effects of Race on Aggravated Departures:
In both 1981 and 1984, race is statistically significant at the
.001 level.8 5 In counterpoint to the mitigated departure data, in
84. No comparable data on aggravated departures exists for this year since no
cases on aggravated dispositional departures were sampled in this study.
85. A .001 level of significance basically means that the chance that the MLE
found occurred by chance is less than one in one thousand.
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1978, race did not affect sentencing decisions as in 1981 and 1984.
While the actual magnitude of difference is not great, African-
Americans are less likely to receive aggravated disposition depar-
tures after the introduction of the guidelines. Thus, the role of
race in determining whether an aggravated dispositional departure
will be granted seems to have become more important after the
passing of the sentencing guidelines.
Fffects of Socioeconomic Status on Aggravated Departures:
Another pattern that echoes the one seen in the probit analy-
sis of mitigated departures is the role of socioeconomic status in
determining whether an offender will receive an aggravated depar-
ture. In the case of mitigated departures, owners, white collar
workers and professionals, especially, were more likely to receive
mitigated dispositional departures. The probit analysis of aggra-
vated dispositional departures suggests that the converse is also
the case. For each of the years for which data on aggravated de-
partures was available, the data suggests that if a convicted felon
occupied one of these "upper" socioeconomic occupations, the felon
was less likely to receive an aggravated dispositional departure.
Indeed, out of the fifty-eight "professionals" in the 1984 sample,
none received an aggravated departure and hence the variable was
dropped out of the equation because it predicted the failure of an
aggravated departure perfectly. Professionals and white collar
workers also showed a general negative coefficient, meaning it was
less likely that these two groups would receive aggravated depar-
tures. Both negative relationships were clearly statistically signifi-
cant in the 1982 data set. Skilled and unskilled workers alike also
show statistically significant negative coefficients in 1978.
The analysis suggests that employment in general, as opposed
to a particular kind of employment, factored prominently in the
judge's decision whether to give an aggravated departure in the
pre-guideline time period. The lack of statistical significance of
these "lower" socioeconomic occupations and the proportionally
increasing size of the coefficients for the "upper" socioeconomic
occupations suggests that the type of employment has become
more important than employment in general under the guidelines.
The Effect of Marital Status on Aggravated Departures:
Marital status also showed an reciprocal relationship to the
mitigated departure data. Whereas being single made it less likely
for an offender to receive a mitigated dispositional departure, the
single offender was generally more likely to get an aggravated de-
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parture after the guidelines were imposed. This relationship rep-
resents an apparent change from the pre-guideline period when
being single reduced the probability of an individual receiving an
aggravated departure. The trend since the imposition of the guide-
lines suggests an increasing relative importance of marital status
as a determinant of whether an aggravated departure is imposed,
and is clearly statistically significant for the 1984 data.
Fffects of Residential Status on Aggravated Departures:
Whether an offender lived in an institutional setting was a
strong factor in determining whether the offender received an ag-
gravated dispositional departure. The offender who did live in an
institutional setting is clearly more likely to receive an aggravated
dispositional departure. This relationship is also statistically sig-
nificant for each of the years for which data is available and shows
little change from the pre- to the post-guidelines period. The first
year of the guidelines (1981) resulted in this factor having less im-
portance than it did before the guidelines, but over the intervening
years the level of statistical significance and relative magnitude of
the coefficient have increased steadily.
Dispositional Departures Before and After Guidelines
The results of the probit models suggest that the imposition
of the sentencing guidelines in Minnesota have failed to fully ac-
complish their own stated purposes, and failed to provide a coher-
ent underlying philosophical basis for punishment. While some of
the problems that these guidelines were designed to address seem
to be ameliorated, others seem to have been exacerbated, at least
where dispositional departure decisions are concerned. In the case
of mitigated dispositional departure decisions, there seems to have
been success in eliminating race as a factor in the decision-making
process. However, socioeconomic status and marital status, neither
of which seemed to be factors before the guidelines were in place
have become important in determining whether or not an offender
receives a mitigated dispositional departure. This seems to indi-
cate that the sentencing guidelines are not being applied in a neu-
tral or proportional manner to all offenders, violating one of the
basic principles of the guidelines themselves. This is also inconsis-
tent with the "just deserts" model of punishment, as those individ-
uals who are probably less likely to be recidivists (those occupying
"upper" socioeconomic occupations) are receiving mitigated depar-
tures more often than those individuals who are not similarly situ-
ated in terms of occupation.
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These same patterns are reflected in the analysis of aggra-
vated dispositional departures. Race, unlike mitigated departures,
seems to play a stronger role than it did before the sentencing
guidelines were put into place. However, the differences among
racial groups is not great. Likewise, the lack of community ties in
the case of institutionalized offenders continues to be a primary
determinant of whether an aggravated dispositional departure is
granted. These findings would also be inconsistent with the "just
deserts" model underlying the sentencing guidelines.
These results suggest systematic biases continue to play a role
in sentencing decisions and in some cases, new systematic biases
have been created in dispositional departure decisions. This does
not necessarily mean that the judiciary has become more biased in
their decision-making, but suggests that existing biases or opposed
philosophical bases for punishment, conscious or unconscious, have
been channeled into areas in which judges still have discretion in
their decision-making.
Judicial Rules: Modifications of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines
One of the primary purposes of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines was to eliminate disparities based on factors such as
race, gender, socioeconomic status and community ties from the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.8 6 The purpose in establishing a
determinate sentencing system and not allowing these factors to
be taken into account is to provide a check against judicial discre-
tion manifesting bias towards individuals with certain characteris-
tics and to provide a coherent philosophical basis for punishment.
The development of independent judicial criteria to justify depar-
tures from determinate sentencing guidelines creates the opportu-
nity for judges to reintroduce the same sort of discretion the
guidelines were designed to eliminate. The policy rationales be-
hind determinate sentencing (even administration of the law, phil-
osophical coherency, and no subversion of the purpose of the
criminal code) may all become corrupted if such judicial discretion
is permitted.
In Minnesota, several judicially developed rules have evolved
that affect sentencing procedures and outcomes.8 7 Among the
most important of these are the ability to successively increase the
offender's criminal history in cases of multiple behavioral inci-
86. See supra note 16.
87. See generally -Shapiro, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN HISTORI-
cAL OVERVIEW AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE CASE LAW (1987).
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dents under the Hernandez rule,88 plea bargaining practices,8 9 and
an offender's amenability to treatment as a reason for a mitigated
dispositional departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
Of these Minnesota modifications, it is the "amenability to
treatment" grounds for mitigated dispositional departures which
seem the most problematic to the underlying purposes of determi-
nate sentencing and the express purposes of Minnesota's guide-
lines system. Amenability to treatment is a loose and ill-defined
concept which allows many factors to be considered. The question
of what makes an individual amenable to treatment can have a va-
riety of answers such as being less likely to commit the crime
again, having strong ties to the community and a array of other
possible answers all of which impute impermissible criteria into
the sentencing decision.90 This ground for departure, it has been
argued, reintroduces the very socioeconomic, racial and other fac-
tors back into the determination of sentencing.91 Others contend
that "amenability to treatment" grounds for a mitigated disposi-
tional departure does not represent a fundamental violation of the
goals of the Sentencing Guidelines, but are in line with its broad
purposes. 92 While it may be true that the Sentencing Guidelines
allow for other philosophical justifications for sentencing, they do
not allow for disparate treatment based on race, gender, educa-
tional attainment or socioeconomic status.
What is clear is that the use of "amenability to treatment" is
88. State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981). MIrMM & MOORE, supra
note 28.
89. In Minnesota, see Miethe & Moore, supra note 19. In general, see
Heumann & Loftin, supra note 17; Alschuler, supra note 28.
90. Since the Minnesota guidelines are based upon a 'just deserts' model, ques-
tions of recidivism, connections to the community, and socioeconomic status are all
impermissible. It is hard to find definitions for amenability to treatment which
might not bring such criteria back into the sentencing decision. The most obvious
possibility is amenability to treatment for chemical abuse problems. Such a finding
could be made on post-arrest, pre-sentencing completion of a chemical dependency
program. Outside of this area, however, the use of amenability to treatment as a
grounds for departure seems problematic.
91. Miethe & Moore, point out that
[slince judgments about the amenability of a felon to probation are
based on an overall assessment of the person (including in many cases
community ties, family stability and employment history), the accept-
ance of this reason as a grounds for dispositional departure clearly in-
troduces social factors in sentencing which are otherwise prohibited
under the guidelines.
MIETHE & MOORE, supra note 28, at 84.
92. See Frase, supra note 39. Frase contends that since the guidelines "explic-
itly recognize the goals of 'retribution, rehabilitation, public protection, restitution,
deterrence, and public condemnation of criminal conduct,'" that there is nothing
inherently improper about this approach. Frase does, however, go on to suggest
that there may be some linkage with impermissible criteria.
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an increasingly cited reason for departure from the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines as Figure 1 below illustrates.93
FIGURE 1
Percentage of Mitigated Dispositional Departures in which
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Not only have mitigated dispositional departures as a whole
increased in number and in percent of total cases, but the percent-
age of those mitigated dispositional departures due to "amenability
to treatment" have likewise increased in number.
In order to determine whether "amenability to treatment" is
reintroducing inappropriate criteria, the same probit model was
used for examining mitigated and aggravated departures. The
model examines whether offenders who receive a mitigated dispo-
sitional departure due to "amenability to treatment" differ sub-
stantially from convicted felons in general, not merely those who
are receiving a mitigated dispositional departure. If "amenability
to treatment" does reintroduce impermissible factors into the sen-
tencing decision, the results of this model should show that these
impermissible factors play a role. The role that they should play,
in relation to our results on mitigated departures, in general, is dif-
ficult to state with any theoretical certainty. That is, we have seen
that impermissible factors clearly affect the probability of whether
a mitigated dispositional departure will be granted. Theoretically,
93. A mitigated departure was categorized as due to amenability to treatment if
any of the reasons the judge cited as a reason for departure involved amenability to
treatment.
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if "amenability to treatment" were the only logical or available
method of importing these impermissible factors back into the de-
cision-making process we should see a greater dependence on
these impermissible factors. However, the extent of discretion
under available or often used reasons for departure from the
guidelines is unknown.9 4
A PROBIT Analysis of Amenability to Treatment
The same probit model was run on amenability to treatment
to examine whether the systematic biases found in the sentencing
decisions to grant a mitigated dispositional departure were
stronger for the amenability to treatment reason for departure. 95
In using probit analysis, for each variable a maximum-likeli-
hood estimation technique is used.96 If amenability to treatment is
reintroducing impermissible criteria into the sentencing decision,
our model would find the same factors playing a role we found in
mitigated dispositional departures. If amenability to treatment is
being used primarily to reintroduce impermissible criteria, the sta-
tistical relationships we found in the mitigated departures should
be stronger for amenability to treatment.
The first model of amenability to treatment tested was one
that included all reasons for amenability to treatment, including
chemical dependency rehabilitation. The results for each of the
four years are displayed in Table 3 below:
94. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission own list of reasons for
departure used in coding the responses from the worksheets received from judges
are several pages long and contain many broad reasons for departure. It is very
probable that "amenability to treatment" is merely one of the ways in which imper-
missible factors are brought back into the sentencing decision process. If this is the
case, we cannot make any theoretical assumptions about what the results of these
models should be.
95. We are examining which factors are involved in determining whether a par-
ticular offender, out of all offenders, will be found to be amenable to treatment.
96. The MLEs represent a change in the probability that the felon will receive
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* - significant at .001
** - significant at .01
- significant at .1
- dropped due to perfect prediction of not amenable to treatment.
The second model used to predict amenability to treatment
did not include any case in which drug or alcohol rehabilitation
was referred to as a reason for departure. This was done to avoid
problems of drug and alcohol abuse correlating with the
independent variables in the equation. The analysis attempted to
see if the results would differ substantially from the above model
on amenability to treatment.98
97. This "amenability to treatment" includes all references to drug and alcohol
rehabilitation.
98. If, for example, unemployed persons are more substantially more likely to
abuse drugs or alcohol, that fact alone will make it more probable they will receive
mitigated departures due to "amenability to treatment" that relate specifically to




Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Factors
an Offender is Amenable to Treatment 9
Influencing Whether
Variable Coefficient
amenl 1981 1982 1984 1987
RACE
white 3.35* -1.03*** 4.31* 4.40*
black 3.00* -1.11*** 4.47* 4.52*
indian 3.30* -. 80 4.84* 4.40*
hispanic 3.50* **** **** 3.98*
asian **** ****
JOB TYPE
unemploy -. 44 **** -. 12 .18
owner N/A N/A **** -. 02
profes .45 **** .73*** .82
whitec -. 03 -. 08 -. 19 .29
skill -. 11 -. 10 .27 .15
unskill -. 13 .08 -. 26 .30
ag N/A N/A ****
MARITAL
single -. 34 -. 11 -. 12 -. 21
male **** **** .30 .49**
RESIDENCE
alone .07 3.85* .41 .18
spouse .26 4.31* .38 .16
friend **** 4.09* .21 -. 02
fam .23 4.27* .24 .16
inst .65*** **** **** .35
constant -5.40 -5.33 -6.80 -6.83
* - significant at .001
** - significant at .01
- significant at .1
- dropped due to perfect prediction of not amenable to treatment.
These data suggest somewhat different conclusions than the
previous examination of mitigated and aggravated dispositional
departures.
The Effect of Race on Amenability to Treatment:
The data indicate that regardless of how amenability to treat-
ment is characterized,100 a basic pattern over time shows race as
amenability to treatment as a method of introducing impermissible factors into the
sentencing decision.
99. This "amenability to treatment" does not include any cases in which a
reason relating to alcohol or drug treatment was reported.
100. We examine all decisions involving amenability to treatment, including
chemical dependency reasons. We could instead look at general "amenability to
treatment" to examine if there is some particular racial or socioeconomic bias. For
example, if Hispanics were more likely to be chemically addicted, it would be ex-
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the most important factor in whether an offender is "amenable to
treatment." For both 1981 and 1982, African-Americans were less
likely than whites to be found to be amenable to treatment. By
1984 and 1987, they were slightly more likely to be found amena-
ble to treatment. This reflects the pattern of race becoming less
important in determining mitigated dispositional departures in
general. The difference in likelihood of different racial groups re-
ceiving amenability to treatment departures is not of great
magnitude.
The Effect of Socioeconomic Status on Amenability to
Treatment-
The clear systematic bias found in mitigated departures in
general is largely absent in cases specifically involving "amenabil-
ity to treatment." Professionals still show an expected strong like-
lihood for being found amenable to treatment, but this likelihood
is only statistically significant in 1984. In general, an offender's so-
cioeconomic status seems to have only a slight relation to whether
he is "amenable to treatment."
The Effect of Marital Status on Amenability to Treatment:
The consistent pattern of bias towards single individuals
found in the mitigated departure data, is only faintly echoed in the
"amenability to treatment" data. For amenability dispositional de-
partures granted for reasons other than drug or alcohol rehabilita-
tion, the bias against single individuals receiving such a
dispositional departure is consistent over three of the four years
examined.
The Effect of Gender on Amenability to Treatment:
Male offenders are consistently less likely to receive miti-
gated departures on the ground of amenability to treatment.
The Effect of Residence on Amenability to Treatment:
A pattern somewhat at odds with the data on mitigated de-
partures develops when examining offenders who live in institu-
tional settings. While they are less likely to receive mitigated
dispositional departures, when they do, they are more likely to re-
ceive them for "amenability to treatment" purposes, especially
when "amenability" relates to a drug or alcohol addiction. This
pected that they would more often be granted mitigated departures for chemical
dependency treatment reasons rather than others.
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seems to be a logical result of the intent of the "amenability to
treatment" ground for departure. It is likely that a significant
number of offenders living in institutional settings do so because of
drug or alcohol related problems. When these offenders receive a
mitigated dispositional departure it is consistent that they would
receive such a departure based on their drug or alcohol addiction.
Amenability to Treatment Departures Under the
Guidelines
The strongest biases that appear in the data on "amenability
to treatment" show up in the first two years of the sentencing
guidelines. The data for the other two years examined indicate lit-
tle of the systematic biases found in mitigated departure decisions
in general. It does not seem to be the case that the "amenability to
treatment" ground for departure reintroduces impermissible crite-
ria for sentencing decisions into the guidelines. In fact, the use of
impermissible criteria which is markedly present in the mitigated
departures data is markedly absent or greatly weakened when we
examine mitigated departures due to "amenability to treatment."
The strong biases shown in the early years of the guidelines may
indicate that initially this ground for departure was importing
some of the impermissible criteria. There are a number of reasons
why this may not still be occurring.
Primarily, it may be due to the increased use of "amenability
to treatment" as a grounds for departure. Since its permissibility
as a grounds for departure was confirmed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1982, its use has substantially increased. This
increase may well have "watered down" any initial discriminatory
effects brought into play by the use of this grounds for departure.
Now, there may be more judges using permissible criteria to grant
an amenability to treatment departure whereas before the Minne-
sota Supreme Court ruled, a smaller number were using impermis-
sible criteria to circumvent the Guidelines.
The data indicate that while decisions regarding mitigated
and aggravated dispositional departures have continued to use, and
in many cases have increasingly used, impermissible criteria, deci-
sions based on "amenability to treatment" have been moving away
from the use of impermissible criteria. Most of the literature has
suggested the converse is occurring, that is, while sentencing is be-
coming more uniform, the potential for abuse in discretion lies in
vague and broad grounds for departure (e.g. "amenability to treat-
ment"). This is not the case. The application of "amenability to
treatment" by Minnesota judges is not letting in criteria which the
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sentencing guidelines already tossed out of the decision-making
process. Yet, the criteria which were supposed to be eliminated by
the guidelines continue to play a prominent role in sentencing de-
cisions, and in some cases and increasingly important one. What
are we to make of this paradox?
It would seem that biases which have existed have been chan-
neled more directly into the remaining areas of judicial discretion,
just not through the justification of "amenability to treatment."
Conclusions and Implications
We can establish that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
have not succeeded in fully implementing their own stated pur-
poses, nor have they been successful in remedying the inherent po-
tential sources of conflict in the American criminal law system.
At the broadest level of coherency, the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines operates on an avowedly "modified just deserts" philo-
sophical basis. The primary concern for the application of the law
is that similar criminal actions be treated in a like manner. Yet,
the data indicates that individual offender characteristics play a
clear role in determining whether an offender will receive a miti-
gated or aggravated dispositional departure. The judiciary, in its
sentencing decisions, is not operating from a "just deserts" philo-
sophical basis. The fact that members of upper socioeconomic
strata obtain preferential treatment indicates that concerns such as
recidivism are entering into the judicial decision-making process.
This lack of philosophical coherency has led to an uneven ad-
ministration of the criminal law that advantages some members of
society while disadvantaging others. Race, generally, has become
less important in the decision whether to grant a mitigated disposi-
tional departure, but remains an important factor in granting ag-
gravated dispositional departures although the inter-racial
differences are not great. Individuals who could be seen as not
having strong community ties, such as people who are not married,
are consistently discriminated against in the sentencing decision
process. They are more likely to receive aggravated departures
and less likely to receive mitigated departures. Likewise, offend-
ers who live in institutional settings are far more likely to receive
aggravated dispositional departures than other offenders.
There is a clear and pervasive reverse effect involving indi-
viduals whose occupations place them in "upper" socioeconomic
strata. Business owners, professionals, and white collar workers
all are more likely to receive mitigated dispositional departures
and less likely to have aggravated dispositional departures im-
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posed. This pronounced benefit has clearly increased since the im-
position of the sentencing guidelines in Minnesota.
The imposition of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on
the judiciary has not succeeded in carrying out many of its stated
objectives. It seems to have exacerbated the importance of many
impermissible criteria in sentencing decisions in such a way as to
work in favor of the socially and politically advantaged while
harming the socially and politically disadvantaged.

